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I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Dr. Klaus Berger, in Renegotiation and Adaptation of
InternationalInvestment Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters and
Arbitrators, proposes that international investment contracts include
a clause allowing the parties to renegotiate the terms of their contract
if certain events take place.' If they are unable to reach an
agreement, Professor Berger advocates that the parties agree to
permit an arbitral tribunal to modify the terms of the contract to
restore the economic equilibrium assumed by the parties when they
concluded the agreement.2
Although commentators have often
championed these clauses, private parties involved in international
transactions have included them infrequently.3 This hesitancy may
stem from fears that these clauses will make the contractual
relationship unpredictable, raise the overall costs of the transaction,
and be unenforceable or, if a tribunal is called upon to adapt the
terms of the contract, will result in an unenforceable decision, or in
the tribunal modifying the contract in a way that neither party

Associate Dean for Resarch, Professor of Law and Director, J.D./M.B.A. Program,
Villanova University School of Law.
1.
Klaus Peter Berger, Renegotiation and Adaptation of International
Investment Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters and Arbitrators, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1347 (2003).
2.
Id. at 1348-50.
3.
See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiating International Business
Transactions:The Continuing Struggle of Life Against Form, 35 INT'L LAW. 1507, 1536

(2001).
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intended. Despite these concerns, I agree with Professor Berger that
such clauses may be beneficial in international investment contracts,
but in more limited circumstances than he posits. 4 Specifically, I
argue that renegotiation clauses should not be included when one of
the parties controls the event that triggers renegotiation and
adaptation. The renegotiation and adaptation clause should provide a
tribunal with criteria to guide any adaptation of the agreement.

II. RENEGOTIATION AND ADAPTATION CLAUSES
Renegotiation clauses are provisions in contracts that, upon the
happening of a certain event or events, require all parties to return to
the bargaining table and renegotiate the terms of their agreements.
Professor Berger states that these clauses are particularly useful in
international investment contracts between a private party and a
government entity. 5 He argues that because these contracts typically
are of long duration, the political, economic and social climate could
change radically during this period and dramatically alter the
economic benefits that the parties originally envisioned would flow
from the agreement.6 He also argues that a renegotiation clause may
both protect a state's sovereign right to change laws that may affect
the agreement and provide a measure of protection to the private
investor. According to Professor Berger's argument, instead of
mandating that a state not change its laws in a way that would
disrupt the financial returns negotiated under the parties'
agreement-as do many traditional stabilization clauses-the clause
would allow the state unilaterally to take steps that would affect its
contractual regime. 7 However, the investor would then have the right
to renegotiate or adapt the contract with the aim of restoring the
original equilibrium between the parties. 8 Professor Berger asserts
that using a renegotiation and adaptation clause in this manner
leaves a state's sovereignty intact and protects the investor against
changes in the law governing the agreement. 9

4.

Berger, supra note 1, at 1348-50.

5.

Id. at 1358-60.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1348.
1349.
1349-51.
1364.
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III. THE POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS

Renegotiation clauses are not a panacea; they have a number of
drawbacks. Investors may refuse to include them in their contracts
for five reasons.' 0 First, such clauses may reduce contract stability."
Second, including renegotiation clauses may raise the overall costs of
the transaction. 12 Third, if the parties are unable to agree as a result
of renegotiations and third-party adaptation of the contract is sought,
an arbitral tribunal may decline to exercise jurisdiction or the
adaptation may be unenforceable because of a lack of a "dispute"
between the parties.' 3 Fourth, if the parties' original agreement fails
to provide the tribunal with sufficient parameters to adapt the
contract, the tribunal may rewrite the agreement in a way that
neither party intended. 14 Fifth, the events that trigger renegotiation
may be within the control of the host state, raising the possibility that
the process could be used unfairly to alter the agreement. 15
The first potential downside is that a renegotiation clause may
interject uncertainty into the contractual arrangement. 16 Businesses
value certainty and predictability. 1 7 In fact, predictability has been
identified as a key element to a favorable climate for foreign
investment. 18 As one arbitral tribunal pointed out: "[O]ne of the
primary goals of contracting is providing predictability and certainty
for the parties. Only in highly exceptional circumstances is it

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at. 1372-73.
Id. at 1376
Id. at 1362.
One commentator notes:

It is sometimes asserted that renegotiation clauses reduce, rather than
increase, contract stability. In discussions on that subject a typical remark is:
"Why should we include a renegotiation clause in our contract? Is it not more
stable not to have one?" This is certainly right from a purely legal point of view.
Wolfgang Peter, Arbitrationand Renegotiation Clauses, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 29, 31 (1986).
17.
See generally A Report on the ICC Rules of Contractual Relations, 5 ICC
BULL. 31 (1994) (noting that businesses disliked clauses providing for third-party
adaptation of contracts because they saw such clauses as intruding into the contractual
relationship).
18.
Jeswald W. Salacuse, Direct ForeignInvestment and the Law in Developing
Countries, 15 FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 382, 387 (2000).
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permissible to deviate from these considerations, which apply in
particular in the international context." 19
History verifies the significance of creating uncertainty. 20 In
1978, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) promulgated
rules for the adaptation of contracts. 21 In 1994, however, the ICC
withdrew these rules because they had never been used. 22 An ICC
Report noted that practitioners viewed adaptation clauses with
23
skepticism, preferring instead the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
U.S. businesses in particular may be reluctant to include
compelled renegotiation and adaptation clauses both because of the
legal system's reliance on the principle of pacta sunt servanda and
because such clauses are not regularly used in common-law countries,
as they are in civil-law countries, like Germany and the
Netherlands. 24 One commentator noted that the "reason for the
difference between the common-law approach and the modern civillaw approach is that the leading common-law countries have not
suffered from the unmanageable inflation that has ravaged much of
the civil-law world. '2 5 However, he adds that "U.S. law should realize
that international trade is different from domestic trade, and the
'26
modern civil-law solution... deserves respect.
The second potential drawback is that renegotiation clauses may
come at a cost. 2 7 When confronted with uncertainty of economic
return, an investor may abstain from entering into the investment
agreement or "structure the investment in such a way as to increase
returns to offset the risk created by the environment.12 8 Accordingly,

19.
Interim Award in Case No. 1694 of 1996, reprintedin 23 Y.B. COM. ARB. 97,
110 (1998); see also First Award on Force Majeure and Final Award in Case No. 4462 of
1985 and 1987, reprintedin 16 Y.B. COM. ARB. 54, 59 (1991).
See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ADAPTATION OF CONTRACTS
20.
(ICC Publication No. 326, 1978).
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
See id.; see also W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 710-11 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the ICC adaptation
procedure). Cf. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1306-07 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (noting that, with regard to treaties, the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus "is necessarily limited, because it is the function of the law to enforce
contracts or treaties even if they become burdensome for the party bound by them" and
thus "almost all cases in which the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has been invoked
before an international tribunal, the latter, while not rejecting it in principle, has
refused to admit that it could be applied in the case before it").
24.
See Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT
Principles of InternationalCommercial Contracts, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 26-27
(1997) (noting that the duty to accept equitable adjustment "approximates the law in
countries such as Argentina, Germany, and Italy").
25.
Id. at 27.
26.
Id.
27.
Salacuse, supra note 18, at 387.
28.
Id.
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if a host state mandates such a clause in any foreign investment
contract, the state may lose the foreign investment or have to pay
more for the investment of capital. In the latter case, in light of the
increased uncertainty, the investor would seek a higher return on the
investment than that investor would otherwise require, thus raising
the overall transaction costs.
The third downside is that, even if a renegotiation clause is
included in an investment contract, in the event the parties are
unable successfully to renegotiate the terms of their contract, it is
29
unclear whether a "dispute" would exist between the parties.
Without a "dispute," the arbitral tribunal may not exercise
jurisdiction and, even if it does, the tribunal may be unable to decree
30
an enforceable award.
Some tribunals have concluded that when parties are unable to
reach an agreement in renegotiation, there is no breach of contract
31
because "[a]n obligation to negotiate is not an obligation to agree.
32
As a result, there may exist no real "dispute" between the parties.
Some commentators also believe that there is no dispute when the
parties request an arbitral tribunal to adapt a contract; others
disagree. 33 This may be a critical issue because the existence of a
"dispute" is a prerequisite for arbitration under the ICSID
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, upon which many
national arbitration laws are based. 34 If the applicable national law

29.
See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 22-29 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
30.
Id.
Award in the Matter of an Arbitration Between Kuwait and the American
31.
Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), Mar. 24, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 976, 1004
(1982).
32.
See Gaillard, supra note 29, at 25.
33.
See id. at 26-29 (citing authorities for both propositions); see also Georges
R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 101, 117
(1984) (stating that "disputes regarding conflicts of interest between the parties, such
as those involving the desirability of renegotiating the entire agreement or certain of
its terms, would normally fall outside the scope of the [ICSID] Convention"); Christoph
Schreuer, Commentary on the ICSID Convention, 11 FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 318,
339-40 (1996) (stating that "[tihe dispute will only qualify as legal [under the ICSID
Convention] if legal remedies such as restitution or damages are sought and if legal
rights based on, for example, treaties or legislation are claimed").
34.
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 25(1) ('The jurisdiction of the Centre
shall extend to any legal dispute arising out of an investment, between a Contracting
State ...and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute
consent in writing to submit to the Centre"); United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, June
21, 1985, art. 7(1) reprinted in HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 258 (1989)
(stating that 'Arbitration Agreement' is an agreement by the parties to submit to
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does not consider the request for a tribunal to adapt the terms of a
contract to be a "dispute," then the tribunal may not have the
authority to adapt the contract.3 5 Further, if the tribunal exercises
jurisdiction improperly, any decision adapting the contract may be
unenforceable under the New York Convention.3 6 As one
commentator noted, "decisions which are not considered as the result
of arbitration proper in the country of origin [are] not ...

within the

purview of the New York Convention and cannot be enforced as a
foreign arbitral award under it."' 37 The lack of a definitive answer to
this question alone may cause parties not to include such a clause.
The fourth problem is of a practical nature for the arbitral
tribunal: the adaptation clause may provide the tribunal with little or
no guidance upon which to modify the terms of the contract. In such
case, a tribunal may be reluctant to adapt the contract.3 8 Even if the
tribunal adapts the contract, without any criteria to apply, the result
could be one to which neither party would have agreed at the
outset.3 9 Thus, such a clause may result in a fundamentally different
arrangement than originally envisioned by the parties.
The fifth concern arises from Professor Berger's position of
allowing the renegotiation and adaptation clause to be triggered by
events that are within the control of the host government.4 0 He views
these clauses as operating in place of stabilization clauses by allowing
the host state to change its laws in ways that can affect the economic
equilibrium of the contract. 41 Doing so would, in turn, give the
investor the right to seek renegotiation or adaptation of the
agreement. Applying a renegotiation and adaptation clause in this
circumstance might increase the likelihood of a host state taking
some action that would cause the investor to invoke the renegotiation
provision. If the contract contained such a clause and the project

arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not").
35.
See supra note 33.
36.
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1988)). It should be noted that the 1986 Netherlands Arbitration Act provides that
parties may agree to submit to arbitration "the filling of gaps in, or modification of, the
legal relationship between the parties." Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure art.
1020(4).
37.
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958 46 (1981); see also Whitney Debevoise, The Arbitrability of Gaps in Long-Term
Scientific, Technical and Industrial Development Contracts, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 122,
128 (1976).
38.
Cf. Final Award of 4 May 1999 (Ad hoc), reprinted in 25 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13,
61; Award in Case No. 1512 (ICC 1971), reprinted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL
AWARDS, 1974-1985 3, 4 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds. 1990).
39.
Final Award of May 4, 1999, supra 38, at 58-61.
40.
Berger, supra note 1, at 1351.
41.
Id. at 1352.
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turned out to be profitable, there would seem to be little downside for
a state to take some action that might change the economic structure
of the arrangement. 42 Of course, by doing so, the state would entitle
the investor to seek renegotiation of the contract. However, the best
the investor could then hope for would be a restructuring of the deal
that would put it in the same position, economically, as if the host
state had not taken such action. On the other hand, the downside for
the host state would be minimal, because the tribunal would be
unlikely to restructure the transaction to make it worse for the state
in light of the profitability of the project. Moreover, the upside could
be very lucrative if the deal were restructured to provide the host
government with more economic benefits than originally envisioned.
The following hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume that a
foreign investor (the Contractor) enters into an investment contract
with the host state (the Government) and the agreement contains a
renegotiation clause similar to Article 34 of the Qatar Model
Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement. It provides:
Whereas the financial position of the Contractor has been based, under
the Agreement, on the laws and regulations in force at the Effective
Date, it is agreed that, if any future law, decree or regulation affects
Contractor's financial position, and in particular if the customs duties
[increase] during the term of the Agreement, both Parties shall enter
into negotiations, in good faith, in order to reach an equitable solution
that maintains the economic equilibrium of this Agreement. Failing to
reach agreement on such equitable solution, the matter may be referred
43
by either Party to arbitration.

Assume that after the agreement has been executed but before
performance has been completed, the Government enacts a law
increasing the customs duties and, as a result, the Contractor incurs
an additional one million dollars in customs duties. At this point, the
investor could pay the additional duties or seek renegotiation. If it
seeks renegotiation, the best result for the Contractor would be that
it would not have to pay the one million dollars; that is, it would be
restored to its original position. By contrast, if the tribunal adjusted
the terms of the agreement, the Contractor could be required to pay
some or all of the additional duties. Thus, the Government has
nothing to lose by imposing the duties. At worst, it would not be able
to collect any of them, and the possibility remains that the tribunal
would permit it to collect some of them.
A renegotiation and adaptation clause is not the only legitimate
method of protecting a foreign investor from adverse changes in a

42.
See Peter, supra note 16, at 32 (stating that a "host country is more likely
to invoke [a renegotiation] clause first").
43.
Piero Bernardini, The Renegotiation of Investment Contracts, 13 FOREIGN
INVEST. L.J. 411, 416 (1998).
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host state's laws. 44 Stabilization clauses have undergone substantial

evolution since the debates over their validity in the 1970s. 45 Scholars
argue that the modern stabilization clauses are more akin to valid
risk allocation provisions. 4 6 Another method used to ensure stability
of the agreement is the enactment of a special law granting
supremacy to the provisions of the contract, notwithstanding any
subsequent legislation that is contrary to the provisions of the
agreement. 47 One commentator states that
such 'freezing of the applicable system' governing the contractual
relation, effected by virtue of a promulgated special law, is currently
considered by international lawyers as the most effective legal method
for securing the 'stabilization' of the regime created by the provisions of
[an agreement for the exploration and development of national
petroleum resources]. 48

The tribunal's decision in Award of 22 April 1978 illustrates this

practice. 49 There, an agreement between Petrola Hellas, a Greek
company established by foreign investors, and the Greek government
provided that any new legislation concerning taxation or customs
duties would not apply to the agreement between the parties. 50 This
agreement was confirmed by legislative decree and thus became
law. 5 1 Thereafter, the government imposed a one-time tax and, when

the government sought to collect the tax, Petrola sought arbitration. 52
The tribunal ruled that the one-time tax could not be applied to
Petrola because it was exempted by the parties' agreement, which
53
had the effect of law.

44.
In practice, a renegotiation/adaptation clause may accomplish the same
thing as a stabilization clause if one of its functions is to restore the equilibrium that
existed between the parties at the outset of the contract following a change in the host
state's laws.
45.
See Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing InternationalInvestment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation,31 TEX. INT'L L.J.
215, 215-20 (1996).
46.
Id. at 265.
47.
See, e.g., Law No. 218 Authorizing the Concession Agreement for Petroleum
Exploration and Exploitation between the Arab Republic of Egypt, EGPC and SA., AM
OIL & GAS, OFFIcIAL GAZETTE, July 27, 1995, at 30, reprinted in pertinent part in
Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, The Particularityof the Conflict Avoidance Methods Pertainingto
PetroleumAgreements, 11 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 272, 274-75 nn. 1-2 (1996).
48.
El-Kosheri, supra note 47, at 277.
49.
Award of 10 April 1978, reprinted in 11 Y.B. COM. ARB. 105 (1986).
50.
Id. at 105-06.
51.
Id. at 105.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 106-07.
[Another] technique [] by which foreign parties have striven to protect their
investment, particularly in the field of natural resources exploration and
production, consisted in removing their contractual relationship from the reach
of the host state's municipal law, the latter being of potential application under
one of the most common rules of conflict, the one connecting the contract with
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In short, there may be significant drawbacks to the use of
renegotiation and adaptation clauses in international investment
contracts and alternative methods may achieve the same results with
fewer potential problems.

IV. BENEFITING

FROM THE USE OF RENEGOTIATION AND ADAPTATION

CLAUSES

Despite the potential drawbacks, investors may find useful, in
certain circumstances, a renegotiation clause combined with a
provision calling for a third party to adapt the contract in the event
the parties are unable to reach an agreement through renegotiation.
Today, businesses are generally open to renegotiating certain terms
of a contract in limited circumstances. 54 They reason that a clause
allowing for renegotiation in light of changed circumstances may
provide parties with the flexibility to modify their agreements rather
than to terminate their relationship. 5 5 Thus, renegotiation clauses
may ultimately reduce the likelihood of a dispute between the parties
that culminates in the termination of their ability to work together on
the current project and on future endeavors. 56 In this way, the
renegotiation clause may be seen as a means of stabilizing the
57
relationship between the parties.
Perhaps renegotiation clauses would be more acceptable to
investors if their scope were limited to unforeseeable matters not
within the control of one of the parties. Indeed, force majeure clauses

the law of the place of its performance. This result was achieved in a first phase
of the parties' relations by making the agreement subject to the general
principles of law or to principles of law common to the countries of which the
parties are nationals or to principles of law common to civilized nations.
Bernardini, supra note 43, at 412.
54.
See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992
WIS. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (noting that, in responding to a survey question asking if their
companies included a renegotiation clause in long-term contracts to protect against
substantial changes in market prices, 41.9% of the general counsels of U.S. businesses
said yes); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiating International Project
Agreements, 24 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1319, 1319 (2001) ('The renegotiation of business
deals is a constant and common phenomenon"); Final Award in Case Nos. 6515 and
6516 of 1994, reprinted in 24a Y.B. COM. ARB. 80, 96 (1999) (stating that parties'
agreement provided for renegotiation of the original contracts in the event the
contractual balance which they had defined at the inception of their relationship was
substantially modified by unforeseen circumstances).
55.
See Salacuse, supra note 3, at 1513-14.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 1514.
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are common in long-term contracts. 58 The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts also provide a framework in
which renegotiation can occur and, if that fails, for possible thirdparty adaptation of the contract, in the event of a "hardship." The
UNIDROIT Principles define a "hardship" as:
[T]he occurrence of events [that] fundamentally alters the equilibrium
of the contract either because the cost of a party's performance has
increased or because the value of the performance a party receives has
diminished, and
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged
party after the conclusion of the contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into
account by the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of
the contract;
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged
party; and
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the
5 9
disadvantaged party.

In the event a "hardship" occurs, the disadvantaged party is
entitled to request a renegotiation of the terms of the contract with
60
the aim of modifying them in light of the changed circumstances. If
the parties are unable to renegotiate the terms of the agreement
within a reasonable time, the UNIDROIT Principles call for a third
party either to terminate the contract or to adapt the contract with a
view to restoring its equilibrium. 61 The hardship provisions of the
UNIDROIT Principles permit both investors and host governments to
modify their agreements in the event of unforeseen circumstances not

58.
See Gerhard Wagner, In Defense of the Impossibility Defense, 27 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 55, 62 (1995) ("[A]n examination of case law indicates that contingency
clauses, such as the force majeure clause, are frequently used. Contingency clauses that
provide explicit allocations of risks are especially prevalent in long-term business
contracts"); see also Dionysios P. Flambouras, The Doctrines of Impossibility of

Performance and ClausulaRebus Sic Stantibus in the 1980 Convention on Contractsfor
the International Sale of Goods and the Principles of European Contract Law: A
Comparative Analysis, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 261, 278-79 (1991), quoting Karl-Heinz

Bdckstiegel, Hardship, Force Majeure and Special Risks Clauses in International
Contracts,3 ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND FINANCE 159, 159 (Norbert Horn ed., 1985):
Experienced businessmen ... normally insert in their contract documents force
majeure, hardship clauses, or special risks clauses, thus "attempting to
anticipate and deal with the situation where unforeseen circumstances
fundamentally change the contractual equilibrium such that an excessive,
normally economic, burden is thrust upon one of the parties.
59.
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 6.2(2) (1994), 34 I.L.M. 1067
(1995) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
60.
Art. 6.2(3).
61.
Art. 6.2(3).
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within the parties' control.6 2 Thus, investors may view these
provisions as facilitating the contractual relationship, not as
interjecting unpredictability into the contract. Accordingly, this
provision may not raise the cost of the agreement. This method does
not eliminate the potential issue of a tribunal's adaptation of the
contract not being seen as a "dispute." However, a number of arbitral
power under
tribunals have determined that they would have the
63
agreement.
an
modify
equitably
to
provisions
hardship
If parties decide to include a clause allowing an arbitral tribunal
to modify the terms of the contract in the event the parties are unable
to reach an agreement through renegotiation, it would be helpful to
the tribunal if the parties provided some sort of criteria to guide the
any
extent of the adaptation. Indeed, as noted above, without
64
guidance, a tribunal may be reluctant to adapt the contract.
Some have suggested that arbitrators use the criteria of fairness
or equity in adapting contracts. 65 One U.S. federal district court sets
forth four criteria to consider in deciding whether a contract should
be adapted in light of impracticability and frustration of purpose: "(1)
the parties' prevision of the problems which eventually upset the
balance of the agreements and their allocation of the associated risks;
(2) the parties' attempts at risk limitation; (3) the existence of severe
out-of-pocket losses; and (4) the customs and expectations of the
particular business community." 66 Professor Berger posits that the
tribunal should attempt to restore the economic equilibrium that
67
existed at the outset of the contract.
In this regard, one Comment to the UNIDROIT Principles may
be particularly helpful to tribunals:

62.
63.

Art. 6.2(3), cmt. 7.
See ICC Award No. 9479 (Feb. 1999), reprinted in THE UNIDROIT

PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE:

CASELAW AND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ON THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 589 (Michael Joachim Bonell ed., 2002); see
also FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

supra note 29, at 28 (citing awards).
64.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text. On the question of whether an
arbitrator has the power to impose an agreement which the parties were unable to
reach, Dr. F.A. Mann noted:
It is not to be doubted that normally a judge or arbitrator cannot make or
modify a contract for the parties. The question in such cases is whether on its
true construction the clause, combined with the arbitration clause,
exceptionally confers such powers. This can only be so where an objective
standard such as reasonableness is set and it is a specific and narrow point
such as a price which on the basis of evidence can judicially be decreed.
Frederick A. Mann, The Aminoil Arbitration,54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 218 n.7 (1983).
See Peter, supranote 16, at 45 (citing authorities).
65.
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 92 (W.D. Pa.
66.
1980).
67.

Berger, supra note 1, at 1358.
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In [adapting the contract,] the court will seek to make a fair
distribution of the losses between the parties. This may or may not,
depending on the nature of the hardship, involve price adaptation.
However, if it does, the adaptation will not necessarily reflect in full
the loss entailed by the change in circumstances, since the court will,
for instance, have to consider the extent to which one of the parties
has taken a risk and the extent to which the party entitled to receive
68
performance may still benefit from that performance.

In addition, in some circumstances it may be more efficient for the
tribunal to terminate the agreement in light of the changed
69
circumstances.

V. CONCLUSION

The complexity and long duration of international investment
contracts make these agreements particularly susceptible to political,
economic, and social changes that may significantly affect the
economic success of the endeavor. Professor Berger is correct in
noting that these factors may encourage parties to include a
renegotiation and adaptation clause. 70 However, the parties should
recognize that such a clause may have drawbacks. If the parties wish
to include a renegotiation and adaptation clause, they should pay
particular attention to three considerations: (1) the scope of events
that trigger renegotiation, specifically whether the events must be
unforeseen and beyond the parties' control; (2) whether the applicable
law or laws recognize the ability of an arbitrator to adapt the terms of
a contract in the event that the parties are unable to reach an

68.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 59, art. 6.2(3), cmt. 7; cf. Richard A.
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 83, 88-97 (1977).
69.
The UNIDROIT Principles provides the following illustration:
A, an exporter, undertakes to supply B, an importer in state X, with beer for
three years. Two years after the conclusion of the contract new legislation is
introduced in state X prohibiting the sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks.
B immediately invokes hardship and requests A to renegotiate the contract. A
recognises that hardship has occurred, but refuses to accept modifications of
the contract proposed by B. After one month of fruitless discussions B resorts to
the court.
If B has the possibility to sell beer in a neighboring state, although at a
substantially lower price, the court may decide to uphold the contract but to
reduce the agreed price.
If on the contrary B has no such possibility, it may be reasonable for the court
to terminate the contract, at the same time however requiring B to pay A for
the last consignment still en route.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 59, art. 6.2(3), illus. 5.
70.
Berger, supra note 1, at 1357-58.
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that the
agreement through renegotiation; and (3) the criteria
71
arbitral tribunal should use in adapting the contract.
During its life, an international investment contract can raise
complex issues. These complexities can force the termination of an
arrangement that could potentially continue to benefit the parties.
Professor Berger is to be complimented for encouraging us once again
to consider a way of preventing such a premature demise.

See Salacuse, supra note 3, at 1533 (setting forth principles to follow in
71.
renegotiating international business transactions).
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